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Abstract 
Over the past two decades, much scholarship has theorized about how highly personalized news media 
might change the public sphere. But even as algorithmic content filtering has become widespread, 
social science research has lagged in understanding how such systems work, and how they have 
altered competitive dynamics between media outlets. Drawing on recent research into recommender 
systems, this paper examines the Netflix prize, as well as collaborative filtering algorithms deployed 
by Google and Yahoo. Content recommendation systems strongly advantage the very largest websites 
over small news outlets, with profound implications for the online news landscape. 
Keywords 
Future of journalism, online public sphere, recommender systems, news personalization, online news, 
digital journalism. 
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The Daily Me in Prophecy and Practice 
In his 1995 book Being Digital, Nicholas Negroponte described a world in which everyone had a 
virtual newspaper entirely tailored to his or her personal taste. Negroponte proposed creating an 
intelligent, computerized “interface agent” that would “read every newswire newspaper and catch 
every TV and radio broadcast on the planet, and then construct a personalized summary”: 
It would mix headline news with “less important” stories relating to acquaintances, people you 
will see tomorrow, and places you are about to go or have just come from. It would report on 
companies you know. In fact, under these conditions, you might be willing to pay the Boston 
Globe a lot more for ten pages than a hundred pages, if you could be confident that it was 
delivering you the right subset of information. You would consume every bit (so to speak). Call it 
The Daily Me. (153) 
Negroponte’s proposal was not wholly new, with antecedents (including some of Negroponte’s own 
work) dating at least back to the 1970s. But Negroponte’s vision of the Daily Me proved highly 
influential, partly because it arrived just as the Web was starting to transform the media landscape. 
The notion was endorsed by key technology industry leaders and top public policymakers (e.g. Gates 
2000; Kennard 1999). Much subsequent scholarship focused on media self-selection as functionally 
equivalent to the Daily Me, with particular worry that the Internet would allow a partisan “echo 
chamber” (Sunstein 2001, 2009). 
In recent years, improved filtering technologies and the emergence of social networking sites have 
produced something strikingly close to Negroponte’s original vision. Google, Yahoo, Facebook, and 
Microsoft—the four firms that together receive one-third of Web visits, according to Experian Hitwise 
traffic data—all rely heavily on adaptive learning algorithms to match individuals with content they 
are likely to click on. Recommendation systems have long been a central part of online sellers such as 
eBay and Amazon.com (Schafer, Konstan, and Riedl 2001). And to the chagrin of some news editors 
and journalists, recommendation algorithms have become a central feature of online news outlets such 
as Yahoo news or CNN.com or Google News. Sites like Facebook have similarly endorsed such 
hyperpersonalization, with Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg stating that “a squirrel dying 
in your front yard may be more relevant to your interests right now than people dying in Africa” 
(quoted in Pariser 2011). With the rise of the iPad and its imitators, Negroponte’s idea that all of this 
personalized content would be sent to a thin, lightweight, “magical” tablet device has been partially 
realized too. 
Recent scholarship such as Siva Vaidhyanathan’s The Googlization of Everything (2011) and Joe 
Turow’s The Daily You has viewed the trend toward personalized content and ubiquitious filtering as a 
part of a worrying concentration of corporate power. Eli Pariser’s bestselling book The Filter Bubble 
voices similar worries. But for journalism scholarship as a whole, as Barbie Zelizer (2009) notes, there 
has been surprisingly little work to date on recommender systems. To the extent that algorithmic news 
filtering has been discussed at all, it has been unhelpfully lumped with a grab bag of different site 
features under the heading of “interactivity” (Bucy 2004; Deuze 2003; but see Stromer-Galley 2004). 
Recent research by Neil Thurman and Steve Schifferes has provided a taxonomy of different forms of 
personalization and chronicled their (mostly growing) deployment across different news sites 
(Thurman and Schifferes 2012; Thurman 2011). Even Thurman and Schifferes’ work, however, says 
little about recommender systems because traditional news organizations have lagged in deploying 
them. Much work remains to be done. 
This paper aims to advance scholarly understanding in two ways. First, it offers a more detailed 
examination of the inner workings of these recommendation algorithms than previous journalism 
scholarship. The mathematical and computer science literature on recommender systems has advanced 
substantially in recent years, but little of this new understanding has so far filtered into research on 
Web traffic, online news, or the future of journalism. In these realms, much of the writing on 
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recommender systems has been an assemblage of hypotheticals and what-ifs. Elaborate deductive 
conclusions have been built from false foundational assumptions. 
Second, this paper examines the comparative impact of these technologies across news 
organizations, something that previous work has overlooked or misunderstood. Scholarship to date, 
where it exists, has focused on the impact of these technologies for an individual Web user or an 
adopting news organization. But there has been little exploration of the wholesale effects of these 
changes not only within a news organizations, but with regard to competition between them. 
This paper begins with a detailed look at the Netflix prize, the first large-scale, open-submission 
machine learning contest. The Netflix Prize helped advance the state of the art significantly for 
recommender systems, and it led to several surprising insights into the principles behind them. Next, 
the paper examines how those principles apply to areas that are critical to the future of news. Two case 
studies are examined in more detail: Google News, the algorithmic news pioneer, and Yahoo!, which 
has recently revealed more about how its behavioral targeting ad technology works. Taken together, 
these cases tell us much about who will win, and who will lose, as recommender systems assume a 
growing role in the delivery of news. 
Netflix and Content Recommendation 
In October of 2006, movie-rental service Netflix kicked off the Netflix Prize, a worldwide competition 
to improve its video recommendation algorithm. The typical Netflix user signs up wanting to see a 
short list of movies, which she watches within a few months. Whether the subscriber stays or leaves 
thus depends on her ability to find new movies she wants to watch. Netflix has stated that three-
quarters of the movies its viewers watch come directly from its recommendation system (Mayer-
Schoenberger and Cukier 2013). 
Netflix offered a $1 million prize to the first team that could beat CineMatch, its in-house 
recommendation engine. Even more remarkably, Netflix actually released its data. Once the contest 
started, anyone could download a real-world data set containing 100,480,500 one-to-five star ratings, 
from 480,189 anonymous users, for 17,770 movies. 
The contest would end up running for more than two and a half years, engaging the efforts of more 
than 5,000 teams. In the process, it illuminated much that is usually hidden about the ways in which 
Web sites personalize the content that users see. 
The central task of the contest was an example of collaborative filtering, using automated methods 
to infer a user’s tastes from the preferences lots of other users. The key contest metric was root mean-
squared error (RMSE)—a measure of how much, on average, a recommendation model misses the true 
value. If Joe Netflix Subscriber gives The Empire Strikes Back five stars, and the original CineMatch 
algorithm predicted that he would give it 4.5 stars, then the root squared error would be 

(.5*.5  .5  (Note that squaring the errors, and then taking the square root, means that the 
RMSE is always positive.) 
The contest hoped to drop the error as low as possible. Predicting that every user would give a 
movie its average rating produced an RMSE of 1.054—a typical error of more than a star in either 
direction. Netflix’s CineMatch offered an initial RMSE of .9525, about a tenth of a star better. NetFlix 
described CineMatch as a relatively simple approach, “straightforward statistical linear models with a 
lot of data conditioning” (Netflix 2007). The contest winner, if any, would be the first time to drop the 
RMSE to .8563. Though this would still leave the model off by more than four-fifths of a star, it was 
nonetheless about twice the improvement that CineMatch had managed on its own. 
The contest showed rapid progress out of the gate. Within a week, several teams had equalled 
CineMatch; within three weeks CineMatch had been bested by 3 percent. These efforts revealed that 
CineMatch was likely a variant of a K-nearest neighbor (KNN) algorithm. If we wanted to predict 
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Maria’s rating for Titanic, for example, a KNN approach might start by finding the users who (1) saw 
Titanic and (2) agree with Maria’s ratings of other movies—those who also hated Gladiator but gave 
five loving stars to A Beautiful Mind. Once this “neighborhood” of similar subscribers is found, 
Maria’s predicted rating for Titanic is just a weighted average of her neighbors’ ratings. If Alex, 
Becky, and Chris are the users most similar to Maria, and they gave Titanic 1, 4, and 5 stars, then 
Maria’s predicted rating is just

1 4 5
3
 3.33. KNN approaches dominated the early months of the 
contest.  
The Netflix Prize attracted a wide range of participants from both industry and the academy, and 
even some members of the general public. Prominent entrants included machine learning faculty from 
the University of Toronto (the team ML@UToronto), and the Hungarian computer scientist and data 
mining expert Gábor Takács, who led the Gravity team. Dinosaur Planet, a team composed of 
Princeton undergraduates, also quickly rose into the top ranks of the public leader board. By late 
November, a team from AT&T Research Labs had also joined the competition. The team’s key 
members were Yehuda Koren, a computer scientist and network visualization specialist, and Robert 
Bell, a statistician with a focus on machine learning. They were spurred on by their colleague Chris 
Volinsky, a statistician and the director of AT&T Labs Statistics Research Department. Bell and 
Koren called their team BellKor, and the duo would ultimately form the nucleus of the winning team. 
One goal of the open competition was to attract and aggregate insights from a far broader and 
diverse group than otherwise possible. As Netflix had hoped, one of the largest single improvements 
came from an unlikely source. In early December 2006, participants were surprised to see the name 
Simon Funk jump to third place on the leaderboard. Simon Funk was the pseuodnym and pen name of 
Brandynn Webb, a computer scientist who had done previous professional work on artificial 
intelligence and pattern recognition. 
While many teams were highly secretive about their methods—and even their membership—Funk 
explained his entire approach in a highly detailed blog post. Funk had applied a factor analysis 
technique called singular value decomposition (SVD) to the Netflix data. SVD is a type of latent factor 
model, in which many observed variables—i.e. the millions of movie ratings—are modeled as the sum 
of a (smaller) number of unknown variables. As Funk explained on his blog,  
The end result of SVD is essentially a list of inferred categories, sorted by relevance. Each 
category in turn is expressed simply by how well each user and movie belong (or anti-belong) to 
the category. So, for instance, a category might represent action movies, with movies with a lot of 
action at the top, and slow movies at the bottom, and correspondingly users who like action 
movies at the top, and those who prefer slow movies at the bottom” (Funk 2006). 
While this claim is true in theory, interpreting factors can be difficult in practice (discussed below). 
SVD had rarely been used with recommender systems, perhaps because the technique usually 
performs poorly on sparse data sets where most of the values are missing. The Netflix data was 
certainly sparse, with most users rating only a tiny fraction of the available movies. But Funk adapted 
the technique to ignore missing values. Taking inspiration from an incremental-SVM approach 
developed for language processing (Gorrell 2006), Funk found a way to implement the approach in 
only two lines of C code (Funk 2006). Funk even titled the blog post explaining his method ”Try This 
At Home,” encouraging other entrants to incorporate the SVD approach into their own models. Nearly 
all of the other top-ranked competitors did so. When the Netflix Prize was finally awarded, SVD-
based methods provided the single largest component of the models on the winning and second-place 
teams. 
Even so, it is unlikely SVD techniques on their own would have been powerful enough to win the 
competition. One of the more unexpected revelations of the Netflix competition was the big 
advantages of blending different learning techniques together. As BellKor reported at the end of the 
first year of the competition, “combining predictions from multiple, complementary models improved 
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performance, with one model’s strengths compensating for the weaknesses of others” (AT&T 2009). 
While SVD might be the single best technique, it would often miss relationships that that would be 
obvious to a human observer, like recommending a sequel to a user who had liked the first movie in a 
series. KNN models were much better at finding clusters of closely related films. By the end of the 
contest, teams were using megablends of hundreds of different models. And while latent-factor models 
like SVD and nearest-neighbors models made up the largest portion of the solution, the final blends 
included a complex mishmash of different techniques, from principle component analysis to ridge 
regression to Restricted Boltman Machine neural network approaches. AT&T’s Chris Volinsky said “I 
don’t think when we started that anybody expected that that would be the way to win the competition” 
(AT&T 2010). 
The same premium on diverse approaches also led, eventually, to a wave of mergers among teams. 
The Netflix Prize rules, in addition the $1 million grand prize, called for the awarding of $50,000 
yearly ”Progress Prizes” for the team currently closest to the goal, providing that there had indeed 
been substantial progress over the course of the year. The catch was that the winning Progress Prize 
team would be required to publish a full accounting of their techniques, allowing competitors to catch 
up. 
As the end of the first year neared, Bellkor had led since March, with a narrow but stable edge over 
the second- and third-place Gravity and Dinosaur Planet teams. But with only a day left in the 
Progress Prize window, the fifth- and sixth-place teams combined their predictions, and the blended 
results vaulted them into second place. This unexpected move set off a flurry of last-minute activity 
(and forum debates about whether this new tactic was fair). The Dinosaur Planet and Gravity teams 
followed suit with a hasty merger of their own, and the merged team submitted a final score that edged 
out BellKor’s previous best. The BellKor team worked through the night, submitting two last-minute 
entries that eeked out a narrow victory in the Progress Prize. 
At the end of the first year BellKor had managed an 8.43 percent improvement over CineMatch. 
But most of the easy progress had already been made. Over the next year the pace of improvement 
would be far slower. In early 2008, after the publication of BellKor’s methods, several new teams 
appeared in the top 20 sites. In February, When Gravity and Dinosaurs Unite passed BellKor to take 
the contest lead. 
BellKor’s next advance came from modeling temporal effects in the data. Some movies— for 
example, The Big Lebowski—grow more popular over time, while ratings for movies like Revenge of 
the Transformers decline (AT&T 2009). Individual users also changed their rating habits over time, 
becoming more or less stingy in their awarding of stars. Adding time-dependent effects added greatly 
to the models’ complexity. Since the average user rated movies on forty days in the sample, for 
example, adding time-dependent effects resulted in a forty-fold increase in user factors. But it did 
provide a slight boost in model accuracy. 
As the contest dragged on, it became clear that BellKor would be unable to win the prize on their 
own. So they, too, decided to seek the improvements that other teams had shown when they combined 
their efforts. As they later wrote, “Teams that collaborated always improved over their individual 
scores provided each team brought different methods to the table” (AT&T 2009, emphasis original) 
Bob Bell suggested a method by which teams could compare their results, without giving away all 
of their secrets. By adding statistically-regular noise to their predicted ratings, teams could share their 
output and perform simple calculations to see how similar their approaches were. These results 
showed that the team BigChaos was the best merger candidate. BigChaos had a relatively low RMSE, 
but more importantly, its predictions were least correlated with the predictions of BellKor, suggesting 
a potential payoff to collaboration. After legal negotiations, the merger went through. 
As it turned out, much of BigChaos’s contribution came from using sophisticated neural networks 
to blend the results. As Bell and Koren later wrote, “Where BellKor used simple, linear blending 
Personalization and the Future of News 
5 
based on each model’s individual performance, BigChaos had determined that the individual RMSE of 
a single method was not the best indication of how much that model would add to the blend” (AT&T 
2009). After the merger, Bell and Koren would send their individual model results to the BigChaos 
members, who would blend them together for submission. 
With the improvements from BigChaos, the combined team won the second Progress Prize in 
October 2008 by a comfortable margin. But progress soon stalled. Once again, the solution was to find 
another team to merge with. This time the candidate was Pragmatic Theory. Pragmatic Theory was 
particularly good at identifying unusual or even quirky predictors, like the length of a film’s title, or 
users that rated films differently on Friday than they would on Monday. On their own, these sorts of 
features predict little about users’ ratings. In the context of the full model, however, they did provide a 
small additional boost in accuracy. 
The teams initially disguised the merger by continuing to post separately. By adding noise to their 
results, they could see how close they were to the 10.0 percent finish line without alerting other teams 
to their progress. By June 2009, the new merged team knew that they had reached their goal. On June 
26, 2009, the new team went public, submitting a 10.05% result under the name BellKor’s Pragmatic 
Chaos (BPC). 
The hectic conclusion of the Netflix Prize proved a replay of the runup to the first progress prize. 
According to the rules, the posting of a result with better than 10 percent improvement triggered a 
final 30-day period for all teams to submit their final answers. With nothing to lose, many teams 
rushed to join forces. The main competitor to the BellKor-led effort was a super-group called The 
Ensemble, which ended up including 16 different original teams, including the previously-merged 
Dinosaur Planet and Gravity groups. The Ensemble improved rapidly in the last few weeks of the 
contest. In the final days, The Ensemble seemed to nudge past BPC on the public leaderboard. But 
since the leaderboard was based on public data, and the contest would be judged on a similarly-sized 
but unreleased private dataset, it was not clear who was really in the lead. 
On September 21 2009, almost three years after the contest opened, BellKor’s Pragmatic Chaos 
was publicly announced as the winner. Only later was it revealed that The Ensemble had achieved the 
exact same level of improvement: an RMSE of 0.8567. BPC had won because of a tie-breaker in the 
fine print of the contest: BPC’s final results had been submitted 24 minutes earlier. After years of 
effort, the contest had ended in a photo finish. 
What Digital Newsmakers Can Learn from Netflix 
Why should those interested in online news care about the Netflix prize? One answer is that these 
recommender systems now have enormous influence on democratic discourse. In his recent book The 
Filter Bubble progressive activist Eli Pariser claims that posts from conservative friends were 
systematically excluded from his Facebook feed. This sort of filtering heightens concerns about 
partisan echo chambers (Sunstein 2009), and it might make it harder for citizens to seek out opposing 
views even if they are inclined to. Increasingly, learning algorithms are also replacing editorial 
judgment and longstanding news norms. 
Yet recommender system should be of interest for an even more fundamental reason. 
Recommender systems do not just influence which articles users see, but also which sites they end up 
visiting in the first place. 
Whether they are funded by advertising or subscriptions, news sites require traffic to succeed. Sites 
quite literally live or die based upon their stickiness—their ability to attract readers, to make those 
readers stay longer when they visit, and to convince them to return again once they leave. Even slight 
differences in site stickiness compound quickly, and rapidly create enormous differences in audience. 
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Recommendation systems are one of the most powerful tools available for sites to keep and grow their 
traffic, and those who cannot deploy them are at profound competitive disadvantage. 
The key question is this: which sorts of news sites can build, and benefit most, from high-quality 
recommender systems? 
The Netflix contest provides a partial answer. Moreover, the Netflix Prize is likely the only chance 
we will have in the near future to look at the inner workings of Web recommendation systems using a 
large, public, real-world dataset. Netflix initially planned a successor contest to the Netflix prize. 
However, facing a class-action lawsuit and an FTC investigation regarding user privacy, Netflix 
canceled the intended sequel (Hunt 2010). Given the legal complications that attended the contest’s 
conclusion, it is currently unthinkable that another large Website would sponsor a similar contest or 
release a comparable dataset. 
The Netflix prize is often discussed as an example of crowd-sourced problem solving. The results 
of the contest, however, suggest that the advantages of recommender systems will accrue highly 
unevenly. The very largest sites have been able to build excellent content recommendation systems; 
the smallest sites have not. 
Recommender systems favor large, well-resourced organizations. In order to inspire such a high 
level of participation, Netflix had to be willing to write a $1 million check. Large teams won the 
competition, and the winning team needed to merge with two other teams to cross the finish line. Even 
stronger evidence for this point comes from The Ensemble’s nearly successful last minute scramble to 
catch up. By combining the efforts of more than a dozen other teams, The Ensemble was able very 
quickly to equal the results of BellKor’s Pragmatic Chaos. Indeed, The Ensemble would likely have 
won if the contest had continued just a few days longer. 
Building successful algorithms is an iterative and accretive process. It benefits from larger groups 
and diverse approaches, and thus provides inevitable size advantages. As the competition evolved, the 
models produced became absurdly complex. Managing this complexity also requires expertise and 
substantial staffing. 
Similarly, the sorts of individuals who rose up the contest leaderboard also suggest limits to 
crowdsourced problem solving in contests like the Netflix prize. Many who led the most successful 
teams were already prominent academic or corporate researchers. Even those who were initially 
unfamiliar names, such as Funk (Brandynn Webb) or the Princeton undergraduates who made up the 
Dinosaur Planet team, had formal training and professional experience closely related to the topic of 
the competition. The project may not have benefited much from the contributions of average citizens, 
but it certainly benefited from drawing on a broader and more diverse set of those with subject-area 
expertise. Netflix would never have been able to hire that level of expertise at five times the contest 
budget. But if the research and positive publicity was worth it, it nevertheless required a seven-figure 
investment. 
Not only do big sites have a large edge in terms of resources, but they also have an even more 
crucial advantage: more data. Building an infrastructure to collect, store, organize, analyze, and 
constantly update data is an enormous investment. This is not something that a small startup could 
have done nearly as successfully, and not just because of the money, hardware and expertise required. 
Data comes from monitoring users, and startups do not have nearly as many users to monitor. As 
AT&T’s team put it, “As the competition progressed, using more information almost always improved 
accuracy, even when it wasn’t immediately obvious why the information mattered or how little the 
information contributed” (AT&T 2009). 
The need for as much information as possible has broad implications. One thing often overlooked 
in the discussions of the Netflix prize is that Netflix already had reached to the overall level of 
accuracy they paid $1 million for. As the contest FAQ explained, 
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The RMSE experienced by customers on the Netflix site is significantly better than the RMSE 
reported for the training dataset. This is due both to the increase in ratings data but also to additional 
business logic we use to tune which of the large number of ratings to learn from... let’s just say we’d 
be seriously in the running for a Progress Prize, if we were eligible. (Netflix 2007) 
In other words, even at the very start of the competition, Netflix was able to do significantly better 
than the raw Cinematch results indicated. They did this both by adding more variables and by training 
on a larger data set. The same techniques used to extract more information from a simple list of users 
and movie ratings work even better with data from (for example) user demographics or browsing 
behavior. 
Recent statements from Netflix indicate that they have gone even further in this direction. Much 
has changed in Netflix’s business since 2006, as the company has gone from a DVD-by-mail model to 
a focus on video streaming over the Web. In a recent blog post detailing their followup to the Netflix 
Prize, they explain that they now operate as if ”everything is a recommendation,” and that they extract 
information from almost every aspect of user behavior (Amatriain and Basilico 2012). Most aspects of 
the site are now personalized based on this data. While they are deliberately cagy about details and 
metrics, Netflix nonetheless claims that optimized models and additional features now provide them 
with a five-fold improvement over ratings data alone (Amatriain and Basilico 2012). 
Yet for learning algorithms more broadly, what constitutes more information is not always obvious. 
More data is not just about more variables. In the initial stages of the competition, several teams 
attempted to supplement the movie data with a host of other details about each movie: the director, 
actors, studio, genre, year, etc. In simple linear models, the inclusion of this data at first seemed to 
improve the results. But with more sophisticated latent factor models and nearest neighbor models, 
adding movie details did not improve the predictions at all. This is likely because the machine 
learning models had already implicitly included all of this information. 
More information can also be found even without collecting more data, by transforming the 
existing data set in order to extract new features. Koren, in a lecture a few months after the contest’s 
end, declared that “One thing that we discovered again and again [...] is that understanding the features 
in the data, or the character of the data, [...] is far more important than picking the right model or 
perfecting the model” (Koren 2009) The Netflix competition started off with a very limited feature set: 
just user, movie, rating, and day of rating. Jumps in accuracy involved taking that limited data and 
extracting new features, like temporal effects. 
The moral here is somewhat paradoxical. Netflix released a massive data set in order to find the 
best algorithm, but the algorithms themselves proved less important than the data. Similar lessons have 
emerged in other, quite different realms of machine learning. In research on natural language 
processing, Microsoft researchers examined how accuracy improved across several different 
algorithms as the amount of training data increased. Although these algorithms showed dramatically 
different performance on tests of 1 million words, as the researchers scaled up the training set—to 10 
million, 100 million, and finally 1 billion words—the algorithms’ performance became more and more 
similar. As Banko and Brill concluded, “These results suggest that we may want to reconsider the 
trade-off between spending time and money on algorithm development versus spending it on corpus 
development” (Banko and Brill 2001). 
The Netflix contest also highlighted several parts of the “black box problem.” One disadvantage of 
complex learning techniques is that, when a model is performing well, it is often not clear why. The 
success of latent factor models in the competition emphasized this issue. In theory, one might think of 
latent factor models as revealing human-interpretable categories like “action movie vs. non-action 
movie,” or “serious vs. escapist,” or “male-focused vs. female-focused.” Sometimes the results that 
latent factor models give do seem to map easily to categories that humans already understand or 
expect. 
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But that is not really what happened with the Netflix prize. The dimensions that popped out of the 
data do not map neatly to obvious predefined categories. Funk’s first attempt at using an SVD model 
(Funk 2006) found that the most important dimension was anchored on one end by films like Pearl 
Harbor (2001), Coyote Ugly (2000), and The Wedding Planner (2001), while the other end of the 
scale was defined by films like Lost in Translation (2003), The Royal Tenenbaums (2001), and Eternal 
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004). Obviously these are very different sorts of films, yet it is tough 
to articulate a concise description of what separates these groupings. As Koren (2009) later concluded, 
“It is very difficult to give names to these axes.” And if one latent-factor model is tough to interpret, 
how much harder is it to interpret the final blend of more than 700 models—many of which were 
themselves blends of different component models? 
In one way, however, Netflix’s example calls into questions claims that filtering technologies will 
end up promoting echo chambers and eliminating serendipitous exposure. Such worries have been a 
centerpiece of scholarship on personalized news over the past decade (Sunstein 2001). One of 
Pariser’s key claims about what he terms the “filter bubble” is that it is ostensibly invisible to users 
(Pariser 2011). Netflix, however, tries hard to make users aware of its recommendation system: “We 
want members to be aware of how we are adapting to their tastes. This not only promotes trust in the 
system, but encourages members to give feedback that will result in better recommendations” 
(Amatriain and Basilico 2012). Netflix also attempts to explain (in an oversimplified way) why 
specific movies are recommended, typically highlighting recommendations’ similarity to movies the 
user has already rated. 
Even more important, Netflix shows that there is a performance boost for recommending diverse 
content, not just for predicting ratings accurately. Partly, this is because Netflix subscriptions are often 
shared among members of a household who may have very different tastes. But as Netflix explains, 
“Even for a single person household we want to appeal to your range of interests and moods. To 
achieve this, in many parts of our system we are not only optimizing for accuracy, but also for 
diversity” (Amatriain and Basilico 2012). The biggest, most blended models that drew on the most 
varied features performed best overall in the Netflix Prize. In hindsight, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
recommending a highly diverse basket of movies also ends up improving performance. But given 
concerns about “filter bubbles” and online echo chambers, a performance bonus for diversity 
challenges conventional wisdom. 
Google News 
The Netflix experience demonstrated several features of recommender systems that are likely to 
persist across many different Websites and varied genres of online content. In recent years, several of 
the largest online Websites have been willing to release greater details about their recommender 
systems, and the algorithms with which they personalize content for their users. Even more so than 
with the Netflix prize, the information released by companies like Google and Yahoo! and Microsoft 
and Facebook is only an incomplete picture of the whole. These companies are undertandably wary 
about releasing information that would give their competitors an advantage. 
Nonetheless, recent disclosures do provide key details about how recommender systems are being 
applied in practice, and how they benefit some organizations over others. In particular, the results of 
A/B testing provide compelling evidence of just how important personalized content is for improving 
site traffic. Recommendation systems dramatically increase stickiness for the largest websites in ways 
small sites cannot replicate. 
Consider the case of Google News, one of the largest news sites on the Web, and a pioneer in 
replacing editorial judgment with algorithmic decision-making. In 2007, Google researchers released a 
paper detailing the company’s internal work in news personalization (Das et al. 2007). In some ways 
recommending news stories is similar to recommending movies. Most users, most of the time, arrive at 
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news site without knowing which specific articles that they would like to see. As Google’s researchers 
put it, user attitudes are dominated by the demands to “show us something interesting” (Das et al. 
2007, 271) 
Yet news targeting also presents a series of unique problems, too. First, news articles provide a 
particularly severe example of the “cold start” or “first rater” problem. All personalization algorithms 
perform well with lots of information on both the items to be recommended and individual user 
preferences. With movies, for example, the accuracy increases for a user as he or she rates more 
movies, and as each movie gets reviews from a larger number of Netflix subscribers. News content, 
however, shows an enormous amount of churn day to day, and even hour to hour. By definition news 
readers are most interested in content that is new, and therefore has relatively little training data. 
Making the matter worse, it is quite costly—in both time and computing power—to constantly rebuild 
or retrain the recommendation framework to offer predictions for the newest content. Because site 
speed is one of the most important parts of the user experience, all Google properties are subject to a 
strict response time requirements. Personalized results have to be returned to the user in no more than 
a couple hundred milliseconds. 
The technical infrastructure Google News requires is daunting: numerous large scale data centers, 
more than one million server computers, enormous investments in fiber, even customized operating 
systems and file systems. Total development costs for this infrastructure, including both hardware and 
software components, likely exceeded $10 billion. Many recommendation algorithms are 
computationally costly to implement at scale, and some of Das et al.’s findings focus on achieving 
similar performance with less computation. The initial paper details several slightly different 
algorithms, all in the same general family of methods as the K-nearest neighbor algorithm described 
above. 
The most dramatic results in the paper come from Google’s testing of how much these personalized 
recommendations improve traffic numbers. Google benchmarked its initial algorithms against the 
baseline in which users were recommended the stories that were most popular at any given moment. 
By interleaving personalized results with results based just on popularity, Google was able to control 
for the fact that higher-ranked items get more attention. 
The results were striking: overall, stories based on collaborative filtering had 38 percent more 
clicks than stories chosen just based on popularity (Das et al. 2007, 279). 
These early methods have now been superseded by even more effective forms of targeting. In 2010 
Google released a second report on its targeting algorithms in Google News (Liu, Dolan, and Pedersen 
2010). Here Google distinguished between the collaborative filtering approaches, which were the basis 
of its earlier work, and content-based approaches. Collaborative filtering looks at the similarity 
between users and between items, whereas content-based methods use text analysis to match users 
with the types of stories they have favored in the past. Content-based models proved better at 
recommending brand new content, and they better allowed for user differences. For example, Google 
reported that its first-generation collaborative filtering mechanism recommended entertainment news 
stories to all users, even those who had never once clicked on entertainment news. 
Liu et al. detail a hybrid model combining both collaborative and content-based approaches. When 
the recommendation system has few news clicks from user, its predictions rely on collaborative 
methods, which tend to focus on the current overall news popularity trends. Yet once the system 
records a significant amount of click data, recommendations are based more and more on users’ past 
behavior and demonstrated interests. 
This hybrid model shows dramatic improvements over collaborative filtering alone, which (again) 
was itself far better than simply recommending users whatever was popular. Compared to straight 
collaborative filtering, the hybrid model produced 31 percent more clicks on news stories, though this 
was largely the result of shifting traffic from interior sections of the site to recommended stories on the 
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front page. Even more importantly, over the course of the study users who saw the hybrid model had 
14 percent more daily visits to the Google News site. This is a remarkably clear demonstration of just 
how much improved recommendation systems can boost daily traffic. 
Other computer science researchers have replicated Google’s results on additional news sites. 
Hewlett-Packard researchers Evan Kirshenbaum, George Forman, and Michael Dugan conducted an 
experiment that compared different methods of content recommendation on Forbes.com. A mixture of 
content-based and collaborative-filtering methods performed best. HP’s hybrid model increased 
clickthrough rates by 37 percent compared to a popularity-only ranking system (Kirshenbaum, 
Forman, and Dugan 2012, 11). Here again, we see dramatic evidence that recommender systems 
increase the stickiness of news sites. 
Yahoo! and Behavioral Targeting 
If Google’s results are potentially worrisome for traditional news organizations, recent research 
released by Yahoo! is perhaps even more dispiriting. Yahoo!, too, has been highly active in 
personalizing and targeting its news results. While Yahoo! itself has been circumspect about releasing 
details of its news targeting methods, journalistic accounts have similarly claimed big improvements 
in news traffic and clickthrough rates. One recent report claimed that personalized targeting increased 
clicks on Yahoo!’s “Today” box by 270 percent (Boyd 2011).  
But if Yahoo! has been relatively discreet about its news targeting methods, recent research papers 
have pulled back the curtain on its targeted advertising abilities. The same technologies that provide 
users with the most clickable content also allow advertisers to match their messages to the most 
promising potential buyers. Understanding how this behavioral targeting works is crucial for 
understanding the political economy of online media. 
There are three general types of online ad targeting. At the broadest level there is property 
targeting, in which ads are run on sites that feature related content or favorable demographics. 
Showing truck ads on an automobile site or a sports site is an example of property targeting. Second, 
there is a user segment targeting, which typically focuses on the age range and gender of the user: for 
example, showing ads for trucks to 25–40 year-old men across a wider variety of properties. 
Both of these methods are crude compared to behavioral targeting. As the authors explain, “The 
key behind behavioral targeting is that the advertisers can show ads only to users within a specific 
demographic of high-value (such as people likely to buy a car) and combine that with a larger number 
of opportunities (places to show ads) per user.” In this case the Yahoo! researchers used support vector 
machines, a common machine learning technique, to predict which users were likely to be good 
prospects. But it is almost certain that similar results would have been obtained with other learning 
techniques. 
The key difference between the Yahoo! research and previous efforts (at least public ones) lies in 
the type of training data. Typically, behavioral targeting models have looked at clicks on an online ad 
as the key metric. Yahoo researchers instead trained their data on “conversions,” sales that resulted 
directly from clicking on an online ad (Pandey et al. 2011). 
Clicks on ads are uncommon, with typical click-through rates just a fraction of a percent. And if 
clicks are rare, conversions are only a tiny fraction of clicks. Increasingly, however, retailers have 
provided Web beacons that beam sales information back to advertising networks and/or partner sites. 
Still, only a handful of organizations have the detailed user behavior and conversion data necessary to 
target in this way. 
Yahoo’s research demonstrates just how much purchase data matters. Pandey et al. performed A/B 
testing between models trained on conversion data, and the same methods trained just on click data. In 
four tested real-world advertising campaigns, conversions increased between 59 and 264 percent. In 
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every case there was a dramatic drop in advertisers’ cost per sale. Advertisers ultimate goal, of course, 
is to get the greatest number of sales for the least advertising cost. The bottom line, as the researchers 
conclude, is that “we can improve the number of conversions per ad impression without greatly 
increasing the number of impressions, which increases the value of our inventory” (Pandey et al. 2011, 
3)  
The research also suggests that the greatest improvements accrue to the largest advertising 
campaigns. Since conversion are rare, only the largest campaigns have enough sales data in order to 
train the models effectively. This is especially note-worthy given that Yahoo! is one of the largest sites 
on the Web, with an enormous online ad inventory. If only the largest campaigns on the largest sites 
are able to take advantage of these techniques, this has significant implications for the Web as a 
whole. 
What do these results mean for news sites--and especially for newspaper websites? For starters, 
they show that standalone news organizations cannot perform behavioral targeting nearly as 
effectively as Yahoo! or Google. Many newspaper executives and print publishers have argued that 
local newspaper Websites are valuable because they (supposedly) reach a local audience. The problem 
is that location targeting through property targeting is crude and inefficient. Nearly everyone who 
visits local newspaper sites also visits the most popular sites. Potential local customers can be found 
more cheaply and efficiently on Yahoo! or Facebook than on the local newspaper Website. 
Size matters for behavioral targeting. Even on Yahoo!, one of the largest online publishers, small 
advertising campaigns cannot be targeted as effectively as large campaigns can. Few if any 
newspapers even have conversion data, and no campaign on a mid-sized local news site has the scale 
that effective targeting requires. That means that newspapers must either partner with big sites or 
online ad networks—at substantial cost—or else subsist on substantially lower impression prices than 
their inventory would receive a larger Website. Neither alternative is attractive. 
Conclusion 
The rise of recommender systems as a key mechanism of news delivery is a tectonic shift in the online 
news landscape, on par with the arrival of the rotary press or the emergence of the Web itself two 
decades ago. Like these previous shifts, recommendation technology strongly favors some news 
organizations over others. In conclusion, we can discern seven broad, interrelated lessons about which 
types of news organizations are likely to win—and lose—in a world with ubiquitous algorithmic 
filtering. 
First, and most important, recommender systems can dramatically increase site traffic. Web traffic 
is properly thought of as a dynamic, even evolutionary process. Recommender systems make sites 
stickier, and users respond by clicking more and visiting more often. Over time sites with 
recommender systems have grown in market share, while those without have shrunk. 
Second, recommender systems favor sites with lots of goods and content. There is only value in 
matching if the underlying catalog of choices is large. Small sites benefit little: users do not need help 
sorting through the content of a news site that only produces 6 articles a day. In the same vein, sites 
that have a wide diversity of content benefit most from recommender systems. Publications with a 
narrower scope—say, sites that focus just on technology news or entertainment gossip—derive less 
value from recommender systems. 
Third, recommendation systems benefit sites with better hardware and more staff expertise. Even 
when the underlying techniques are relatively standard for the industry, deploying them in a 
production environment still takes enormous time, energy, and effort. Moreover, targeting techniques 
are often expensive in terms of CPU cycles and computing resources. Smaller organizations are 
unlikely to have hardware and resources to deploy cutting-edge techniques. 
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The expertise and equipment needed to target content the can also be used to target advertising. 
There is now abundant evidence that personalization systems can provide dramatically better results 
for advertisers, providing more sales per dollar of advertising spending and while increasing the 
overall value of a site’s ad inventory. As the Yahoo! research shows, some sites—and especially sites 
with certain kinds of data—are far better at targeting than others. Sites that make more money in 
online advertising can use that revenue to produce even more content or to improve their sites, further 
increased their advantages over competing organizations. 
Fourth, recommender systems benefit sites with more data, and more valuable kinds of data. The 
most popular and most heavily used sites have a significant advantage in building recommender 
systems over sites that are currently less popular. More signals, and a greater diversity of signals, 
significantly improves performance. 
Fifth, recommender systems do not necessarily produce “echo chambers” or “filter bubbles.” For 
Netflix and for Google News, the best-performing algorithms recommend a broad range of content, 
and they intentionally balance accuracy with diversity. Ideological isolation can still happen through 
other means, of course, and more study is needed. But thus far, the best-documented examples of 
recommender systems do not support the worries of Sunstein, Pariser, and others. 
Sixth, personalization systems promote lock-in, making switching between sites costly. Consider 
an occasional user of Google News who visits Yahoo! News for the first time. Initially, this user will 
see news content that is a significantly poorer match for her individual news tastes. Much of this 
apparent advantage is temporary, as time spent on the Yahoo! News site would provide more and 
more information for Yahoo’s targeting algorithms. But from the user’s perspective, personalization 
algorithms provide large initial barriers to switching from one provider to another. 
Lastly, recommender systems promote audience concentration. This is the opposite of what 
previous scholarship has assumed. Negroponte concluded in 1995 that the Daily Me would be a 
powerful decentralizing and dispersive force: ”The monolithic empires of mass media are dissolving 
into an array of cottage industries... the media barons of today will be grasping to hold onto their 
centralized empires tomorrow.” (57–8) 
While Negroponte’s technological vision was prophetic, his economic logic was precisely 
backward. There is a long tradition in media scholarship that ties homogenized, broadcast media with 
media consolidation (see discussion in Neuman 1991). Mass broadcasting provided large economies 
of scale, where the same sitcom or news broadcast could be seen in hundreds of millions of homes 
simultaneously. But most observers have failed to understand that hyperpersonalization can produce 
the same result as broadcast standardization. One large Website, by learning its users tastes, can match 
users to their preferred content far more efficiently than hundreds of small “cottage industry” sites. 
Economies of scope—where the efficiencies come from providing a broad mix of different products—
generate concentration just as surely as economies of scale do. The Daily Me provides media 
organizations with historically unprecedented economies of scope, and this reality continues to 
reshape the media landscape. 
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